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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\VILLIAM G. GIBBS and
MARY GIBBS,
Plaintiffs a1ld Appellants
-vs.DON L. BUEHNER, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents

1

F'IRST WESTERN FIDELITY,
et al.,
Cross Claimants and Respondents
-vs.WILLIAM G. GIBBS, et al.,
Third Party Defendamts and
and Appella;nts

Case
No.10706

BRIEF OF AP·PELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is really a suit to determine which of the two
groups of parties has been cheated by one Charles L.
\Vall (herein called "Wall"), erstwhile president of
Guaranty Trust Deed Company, whose company is in
hankruptcy and who is, himself, now appealing from
eonviction of federal securities acts violations. The group
wl1ieh has not been cheated will have the land with ref1

erence to which hoth groups dealt. The other has an
action against \Vall if they care to file it.
In essence, we have a quiet title action. The land
in controversy is 61 acres (herein called the "Tract")
in Davis County. In 1962, appellants entered into contracts ~with Wall under which appellants conveyed the
Tract to a trustee from whom Wall would have become
entitled to conveyance of the Tract upon satisfying certain conditions. Appellants claim the conditions were
never satisfied. They obtained a default judgment
against Wall rescinding the sales contract before the
trustee conveyed legal title to vVall or anyone claiming
under him. They contend their title was thereby fully
restored subject only to the mortgage obligation set forth
in that judgment.
Respondents have a variety of claims arising out of
transactions with vVall after he contracted to buy the
Tract and before the rescision of the sales contract. All
the other respondents must stand or fall with respondent First vVestern Fidelity (herein called "Fidelity"),
and, for the sake of brevity, we \Vill concern ourselves
only with Fidelity's claims.
Fidelity contracted to purchase the Tract from vVall
while his contract with appellants was still in effect. It
claims one or more of the following propositions are true:
(1) That ~Wall suhRtnntially performed his contract with
appellants so that appellants must now perform and give
clear titlt> to Fidclit)- aR 1rnrchasl•r from \Val1, or (2) that
appellants, if thPy did not in faet receive the purchase
2

price for which they contracted, are estopped to deny it,
or (:)) that Fidelity has, by deeds already delivered to it,
acquired legal title to the Tract as a bona fide purchaser
for ndue without notice of any fraud Wall may have perrwtrated in obtaining whatever interest he had.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On .June 27, 1962, appellants unquestionably owned
the Tract (Record p. 128). On that date, they entered
into au agreement (Exh. 5) with Wall which contemplatell exchange of the Tract (valued at $183,000.00) for
properties of the same value to be identified, appraised
arnl accepted within thirty days. Pursuant to that agreement, appellants conveyed the Tract to Security Title
Company (herein called "Security") as trustee. Wall
did not produce properties within the thirty days, so the
parties made a supplemental agreement (Exh. 6) on
September 5, 1962. It provided, inter alia, that Wall
could take title to the Tract (i.e. obligate appellants to
instruct Security to convey it to Wall) by depositing
with a trustee securities having a value at least 21/2 times
the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
To implement their agreement, Wall and appellants
entered into an escrow agreement with Security (Exhs.
3 and 4). Security was instructed to convey the Tract
to vVall when certain conditions had been satisfied. Security never did convey legal title to Wall or anyone
elsP (Transcript p. 360). On October 3, 1962, Security
executed and delivered to B. J. Investment Company an
irn.;trnment in the form of a warranty deed to the Tract
3

( Exh. :20), but that instrnnwnt has been judiciall>- determined to ha\'e com·eyed a security interest only
(Exh. 26).
\Vall purported to deposit securities with the
trustee. He did so hy com'eying to Security a property
identified as the Pueblo Motel. To induce appellants to
believe he had satisfied the conditions ·which wonhl
justify Security's co1IYcying the Tract to Wall or his
nominee, Wall made some representations about the
Pueblo J\fotel (Exhibit 21, Transcript 170-74) which were
untrue, which he knew to be untrue, and on which appellants placed some reliance. These representatious will
later be diRcussed in some detail.
Before Serurity in fact parted with legal title, appellants discovered the falsity of Wall's representations.
They then sued to rescind their contract with ·wall, and,
on November 10, 1964, obtained a judgment (Exh. 21) declaring the contract to be rescinded and their title to
the 61 acres to he restored subject to an encumbrance
in the amount of $43,600.00 in favor of Fidelity, which
had paid the B. .J. Investmenh; Company mortgage and
suecceclecl to the mortgagee's interest.
So far as Fidelity is concerned, the record reveals
that it contracte(l with Wall to purchase the Tract on September 10, 1962 (Exh. 9) when Wall had an equitable
interest. Thereafter, :B1 idelity quitclaimed the Tract to
Security on October 3, 1062 (Exh. 16), took a warranty
deed from ·wall on October 4, HJ62 (Exh. 18) and took
a special warranty deed from R. .J. Investments Com4

pany on Nonmber 24, 1964, (Exh. 20) after notice of
appellants' suit against Wall and filing of lis pendens
(R<•co1·cl, p. 131; Transcript, p. 87). None of these transadio11s eoukl have vested legal title in Fidelity because
none of its grantors held it.
·with referenee to estoppel, the record reveals these
facts, all established by Fidelity's own evidence:
Fidelity was aware as early as September 27, 1962,
that S<>curity held title to the Tract under an agreement
whi0h would justify conveyance to Wall only if certain
eomlitions ·were met (Transcript, p. 278). Fidelity was
Jwvertheless "relying" on the representations of Mr.
Ra.v1 and Mr. Sorenson that Wall would immediately
satisfy the conditions and that title would be "forthcoming" (Transcript, p. 275). To assure itself that
\Vall C'onld in fact deliver marketable title to the Tract,
J1-,idelit3' did not demand that Wall produce or record a
<leed from Security. Instead, Fidelity relied on a statement hy appellant William Gibbs, made on September 27,
1962, that "Charlie and I have about settled our diffiC'nlties and are about ready to close" (Transcript p.
278) and on a note left for Mr. Kump, Fidelity's counsel,
by one Patsy Mortenson on October 4, 1962. Mr. Kump
testified that Patsy wrote that Mr. Gibbs said, "Got
(~J1arles Wall matter approved and confirmed last night,
keep smiling." (Record, p. 282.) On October 2, during
a tPlephone conversation, Mr. Gibbs told Mr. Kump that
tlw transaction with Wall "was just about ready to be
eomplei rd hut had not yet been completed" (Record, p.
281).
5

'With reference to the degree of Wall's satisfaction
of the conditions which alone would have entitled him
to a conveyance of the 'l'ract, we have only the testimony
of Mr. Gibbs and Wall. Both testified that the Pueblo
Motel, encumbered as it was when Wall conveyed it to
Security, had no value in excess of its mortgage, and that
Wall deliberately misrepresented its value in an effort
fraudulently to obtain a deed. Fidelity adduced no evidence that the transfer of the Pueblo Motel satisfied
the security requirements of the Gibbs-\¥ all contract or
that it had any value.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court concluded that Fidelity was entitled
to a conveyance of the Tract free from any claim of appellants and entered its decree accordingly. Appellants
are unable to determine on what theory the court proceeded.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A ppellauts seek an order of this Court annulling the
judgment and decree herein, for the reason that the conclusions are against tbe lmv and the findings against the
evidence, and declaring appellants to be the owners of
the Tract subject to the rights of Fidelity as mortgagee.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING
CERTAIN FINDINGS WHICH ARE BASED
SOLELY ON THE COURT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO BELIEVE THE -WITNESSES.
'rhe trial court adopted 45 findings of fact in this
c·aRe. Collectively, they give little indication of the
court's theory, and appellants are uncertain \Yhether
tlw court is persuaded (1) that Wall performed his
agreement with appellants so that he, or his assignee, is
no-w entitled to appellants' performance, or (2) that
appellants are estopped to deny Wall's performance, or
(3) that Fidelity has somehow acquired legal title, by instruments already delivered to it, as a bona fide purchasPr.
In any event, the court made certain findings against
appellants even though not just a preponderance but aU
of the> e\·idence is to the contrary. We will state the finding8 \\·e believe to be in this category separately and comment on the evidence under each such finding.

FINDING NO. 13
"Wall represented that the Glendale property
- the Pueblo Motel - had su,bstantial value.
Plaintiff William Gibbs did not rely on Wall's
re JJrpsentations to a. material extent, but relied
on appraisals by other persons and on information
obtained from telephone calls to building amd loam
offi.cers, and their opinions of value and income,

7

and was motivated primarily by the f arnily dis-

uni:ty and urgent need to dispose of the 61.23

acres.''

l\fr. Gibbs is, of course, the only witness competent to testify as to the representations on which he relied
in making decisions with reference to the Tract. He tesified (transcript, pp. 69-75) that Wall (then associated
with the L.D.S. Church and president of an apparently
legitimate business with advertised assets in the millions) came to him in September of 1962 and proposed
to transfer to a trustee, as the security which would justify immediate conveyance of the Tract to him under
Exhibit 6, the Pueblo Motel. He then made reference
to an appraisal of the property ·which valued it sufficiently above its mortgage to qualify it as security. To
corroborate his story, he called accomplices in California who talked with Gibbs. Every utterance or writing
on which Gibbs could possibly have relied, however, emanated from or was solicited by Wall. No one but Wall
represented that the appraisals were reliable and that
the value had not changed. It was the total presentation by ·wan, although cleverly corroborated, which was
false, known by Wall to he false, made to induce a response, and relied upon at least to the extent that appellants permitted the Tract to be mortgaged. vVe submit that all the information Gibbs received on the day
of Wall's presentation was communicated to Gibbs by
or through Wall and is part and parcel of Wall's misrepresentation.
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FINDING NO. 14

"The Piieblo Motel is in Eagle Rock, which adjoins Glendale, which fact was not shown to be a
materia,z representation or unknown to Mr. Gibbs
at the time of the agreement."
Gibbs testified (transcript, p. 70) that Wall said the
Pueblo Motel was in Glendale, that he (Gibbs) believed
it and had no information to the contrary, and that Eagle
Roek is "quite a different area" from Glendale (p. 77).
There is no evidence that Gibbs knew the property was
actually in Eagle Rock. There is no evidence that Eagle
Rock and Glendale are equivalent business environments.
Section 558 of the Restatement of Torts says "a fact is
material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to
which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.'' The location of a business property is certainly a
factor to be considered by a reasonable man in determini11g \vhether or not to acquire it.

FINDING NO. 15

''The Pueblo Motel was not timely rejected
b1J the William Gibbs group, which attempted to
h~ld that property and still have the opportunity
of bettering their position over other creditors
of Wall and gi1,e them an advantage in this action
o~:er the other creditors of Wall."
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Pueblo Motel was transferred to Security only to secure Wall's obligations to make eventual payment of the purchase price
9

for the Tract. This \Vas Gibb's testimony ( '1 ranscript
p. Gi1) Gun's testimony (Transcript p. 372) and ·wall's
testimony (Transcript of .July 5 hearing, p. 43). Gibbs
was under no contractual obligation to reject \drntever
security was offered. It was merely true that, if acceptahle secmity was deposited with the trustee, ·wan would
become entitled under the September 5 contract (Exhibit
6) to a conveyance from the trustee. Whether or not the
Pueblo Motel was temporarily considered to be acceptable security is unimportant. It was discovered to he
valueless before Security conveyed the Tract, and any
right to conveyance Wall might have claimed was adjudged to have terminated.
1

There is no shred of evidence that appellants attempted to hold the property to gain an unconscionable
advantage over other creditors of Wall. As a matter of
fact, appellants never held it at all. Appellants took
no action ·with reference to the Pueblo Motel. They
were not accepting it as an exchange property, and the
trustee, in Mr. Gurr's words, understood "that it was
just given as security, and Mr. Wall should keep it because he expected to get it hack.''
A reasonable construction of the Exhibit 6 Agreement (i.e. the provision that Buyer reserves the right to
withdraw posted securities) is that Wall could at any
time have withdrawn the Pueblo Motel, had he wished,
so long as the Tract remained intact and unencumbered
with the trustee.
Finally, the evider1ce is that the Pueblo Motel was
acquired by mortgage foreclosure in April of 1964 for the
10

amount of the first mortgage against it (Transcript p.
78). Appellants enjoyed no advantage over the ·wan
creditors by virtue of Wall's having conveyed this worth10ss el1uity to Security. Even if they had enjoyed an
aclvantage, however, it was exactly what they bargained
for.
We would challenge respondents to produce from
this record a document which imposed a contractual
llnty upon appellants to reject the Pueblo Motel as security or to take any action they failed to take.

FINDING NO. 16
"The holding of said property by the William
Gibbs group has not been in good faith."
This is typical of the amorphous and unanswerable
findings made by the trial court in this proceeding. The
eourt finds appellants acted in "bad faith" and do not
have ''clean hands.'' This is a quiet title action, essen-t ially, and hardly a proceeding in equity. If a "clean
hands'' doctrine has application, however, the court
should specify the conduct of the stigmatized party which
is reprehensible.
There is no evidence that appellants violated any
contract with or failed in any duty toward respondents.
They had no business relationship with respondents.
The suggestion that appellants lost their virtue by permitting Fidelity to rely on Patsy Mortenson's note is
particularly ridiculous. Fidelity took a warranty deed
11

to the Tract from \Vall on October 4, 1962. Fidelity
didn't have to rely and could not, in the exercise of
reasonable business judgment, have relied Oll Patsy.
Bt>fore Fidelity proceeded with its transactions, it should
have demanded a conveyance from Security. Certainly,
this would have bet>n the businesslike way to assure that
Wall had safodied the Gibbs-Wall contract conditions.
The obvious reason Fidelity didn't make such demand is
that Fidelity knew the conditions for conveyance had not
been met.
FINDING NO. 18
''Plaintiffs have failed to prove their damage
as to the Piwblo Motel by its not having the full
value represented by Wall and have failed to show
that they have suffered arny damage by reliance on
Wall's representations as to the Pueblo Motel."
Appellants have, if the trial court's decision is upheld, lost $65,000.00, the unpaid portion of the purchase
price on which they and Wall agreed. They have lost it
because they relied on Wall's representations as to the
value of the Pueblo Motel. Except for that reliance, appellants would not have done whatever it is that, in the
view of the trial court, has soiled their hands.
FINDING NO. 20
''The Eagle Rock property at one time appears
to have had the value represented by Wall. A
chainge of freeway made the location less desirable and the property less valuable. Whether Mr.
Wall knew of the change or that the property had
become less valuable, or the extent of the loss of
value of the property was not shown."

12

\Vall testified (Transcript of July 5 hearing, p. 44)
and made an affidavit (Record p. 279) that he knew, when
lw repesentcd to Gibbs that the Pueblo Motel was a
t.:100,000.00 property, that a new freeway had been proposed which would shunt most of the traffic away from
Colorado Blvd., that the property was really worth little
in excess of its mortgage and that the deterioration of
the property and its environment had greatly decreased
its value since the appraisals were made. Mr. Gibbs testified that Wall had made these admissions to him. We
can conceive of no kind of evidence which would constitute a "shov.'1ng" if these kinds will not.
FINDING NO. 21

''The failure of the plaintiffs to produce Mr.
Wall as a witness when they had him under subpoena affects the credibility of plaintiffs' witnesses, including the testimony of William Gibbs
as to the state of mind and representations of Mr.
Wall and as to their good faith and clean hoods."
The Court's readiness to find bad faith and unclean
harnfa - where appellants are concerned - is nowhere
lwtter exemplified than in this finding. In the Court's
view, a party loses all privilege to seek equity if he subpoenas a witness and then decides against calling him.
A 11 the parties had the same opportunity to subpoena
·wall. His prosecution in federal court was well puhlirized. ·while Wall may have expressed repentence,
appe1lants had no control over his testimony and were
obli0'0rl
to reO'ard
him as adverse. We have searched in
·~
b
\'ain for any authority for the proposition that a litigant
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who subpoenas a witness must call him. There is i10
precedPut or text support for the idea that a litigant disqualifies himself for equitable relief by his failure to call
a subpoenaed witness.
FINDING NO. 27

On or about that date First Western Fidelity
was informed by TVilliarn G. Gibbs that the closing
of the Gibbs transaction with Wall was assured,
which statement was made after Gibbs was informed that First Western would not authorize
release of its property by Stanley Title Company
until title to the 61.23 acres was assured."
The evidence about Gibbs' "assurance" has already
been revie-wed. On September 27, (assuming Fidelity's
account is accurate) he said "Charlie and I have ahout
settled our differences and are about to close." On October 2, Gibbs said the transaction with Wall "had not yet
been completed." Beyond that, we have a note to Mr.
Kump from Patsy Mortenson to the effect that the "Wall
matter'' had been ''approved and confirmed.''
If Fidelity really believed that Patsy's cryptic note
constituted an assurance that Wall could now demand
the Tract from Security, it is hardly credible that Fidelity would not have demanded the deed; Fidelity took a
warrant~T deed from Wa1l on the very date of that note.

Finding after finding was made without any foundation in the evidence at all. To support the findings,
the court merely categorized appellants as near perjurers (Record p. 263). The Court particularly so cat0-
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gorized Mr. Gibbs and Mr. :Marshall, both members of the
liar and of good reputation whose testimony in this case
was unimpeached. The Court did so on the sole basis that
they have a financial interest in the outcome of the suit.
It would indeed be shocking to learn that a court may disregard or discredit the testimony of litigants just because they are litigants. The Court, on the other hand,
eulogized Mr. Kump (who also has a financial interest in
the outcome of the suit) even though Mr. Kump's testimony is not essentially different from Mr. Gibbs' as to
their communications.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD DID NOT
EXIST IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
APPELLANTS AND WALL.
At the outset, it should be noted that appellants had
a judgment against \Vall when this suit began, and that
judgment constituted a judicial pronouncement that Wall
had perpetrated a fraud against appellants. As between
appellants and Wall, the issues relating to fraud were res
a<ljudicata. (See 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Section 226.)
The trial court, however, adopted specific conclusions that the elements of fraud were absent in the Gibbs\Vall relationship. (Record, p. 308, Conclusion 5, 6, and
7.) ~We believe the court requires little edification on
the elements of fraud. They are (1) a representation,
(2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, ( 5) his
iutent that it should be acted on by the person and in the
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manner reasonable contemplated, ( 6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, ( 7) his relianee on its truth, ( 8) his
right to rely thereon, and (9) his consequent and proximate injury. (37 CJS, Fraud Par 3; Nielson v. LeamiJ1gton Mines and Exploration Company, 48 Pac. 2d 439, 87
Utah 69; Kinnear v. Proivs, 16 Pac. 2d 1094, 81Utah135;
Guaranty Mortgage Comvany v. Fling, 240 Pac. 175, 66
Utah 128, 23 Am ..Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 20; Restatement of Torts, Sections 526-549.)
The evidence in this record as to the elements of
fraud is voluminous. It consists of the following:

A. Mr. Gibbs' Testimony that:
1. Wall told him on September 22, 1962, that the

Pueblo Motel had a value of $300,000.00, that
revenues from its operation would capitalize at
or above that figure and leave substantial excess
after servicing- the mortgage debt of $129,000.00,
that no depreciation or deterioration in value had
occurred in the year or so since last appraisal.

2. Subsequent investigation revealed that, at the
time Wall made the statements, the Motel was
not producing enough revenue to service its debt,
the property vvas deteriorated, the highway on
which it depended relocated, and the mortgage in
default.
3. ·wan admitted to him in 1964 that he, Wall,
knew (from having just tried to refinance the Motel) that his 1962 statements were false when he
made them and that he had all the facts then
which Gihhs' later investigation revealed.
4. He did not know of falsity of the Wall representations.
16

3. He relied on Wall's r2presentations in dealing ·with the Tract, i.e., permitting it to be mortgaged.
6. Wall was, at the time he misrepresented the
Pueblo Motel, associated with the business activities of the L. D. S. Church and president of an apparently successful lending institution.

B. Mr. Wall testified at the July 5 hearing, gave his
affidavit (R. 277-9) and stipulated (Exh. 29) that:
1. He told Gibbs in September of 1962 that the

Pueblo Motel was worth $300,000.00 on the basis
of its revenues and that the Motel was producing
substantially in excess of the income necessary to
service its debt.

2. That he knew, when he made those statements,
that they were false in that the highway was about
to be relocated away from the property, he had
just tried and failed to borrow additional money
against the Motel, and the existing mortgage was
in de fa ult. (Trans of July 5 Hearing, p. 33.)
3. He was, when he made the misrepresentations,
associated with the business offices of the L. D. S.
Church and president of Guaranty Trust Deed
Corporation. (Transcript of July 5 Hearing, p.
17, 18.)

C. The default judgment (Exh. 21) for appellants
and against Wall on a complaint charging all the elements of fraud, that default being an admission of every
material allegation of the complaint (Credit Men v. Bowman, 38 U. 326, 113 Pac. 63; Jensen v. Barrick, 15 U. 2d
285, B!Jl P. 2d 429.)
There is absolutely no evidence controverting any
aspect of appellants' presentation with reference to
17

fraud. VVP agree', of course, that the existence of
two clements of fraud, the maieriality of the representntio11s and the right of tlw r0cipient to rely on them, involYe the application of principles of law. We \vill comment on these legal principles separately:

~Wall's

A.

1\IATERIALITY OF WALL'S
REPRESENTATIONS
Wall said the property was in Glendale when it was
actually in Eagle Rock; he said it produced income which
woulU justify its appraisal at $300,000.00. Both of these
statements \Vere false. \Vere they material~
The Restatement of rrorts, Section 538, says, ''a
fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question." The value of the security, in this case, was
the only concern of the sellers. If the value was there,
they could he sure of payment if they permitted the Tract
to he alienated. If the value was not there, they could
not be sure.
The editors of A.L.R. have reviewed the leading
cases on thi8 subject and reached this conclusion: "It is
held almost automatically and as a matter of law that the
vast or prc'8ent r<'nts, profits, income or dividends of
the subject matter of a rontract is material and that reDresentatimis ('OlH'erni11g these matters are material." (21
ALR 2nd, 14.)
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False statements as to the location of property will
n lone justify rescission of a sales contract. "It is a well
:c;ettlccl principle that false statements or misrepresentations as to the location of real property which is the sub.i<'rt matter of a transaction constitute actionable fraud."
(23 Am .•Tur., Fraud & Deceit, Sec. 52.)

B

APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO RELY
There was nothing about Wall's history or appearance in 1952 which should have evoked appellants' distrust. He purported to speak knowledgably about a
husiness property as its owner. It was a property 750
miles distant ·with which appellants were unfamiliar.
Tlw view of the Restatement (Restatement of Torts, Sec .
.)40) is that, ''the recipient in a business transaction of
a fraudulent misrepresentation of facts is justified in
relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained
the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation." The cases from every jurisdiction adopt the
eoncept that, in our complex business ·world, a buyer has
the right to rely on a seller's representations a bout a
business property which is the subject of their transaction. In 27 ALR 2d 14, the annotator's summarization on
this point is this:
''The representee has a right to rely upon a positive statement concerning the past or present
rents, profits or income, and need not conduct ~n
investigation to learn whether the statement is
trne or false .... It should also be noted that the
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average businessman or lawyer is not able to
make such an examiHation of the books of a business as would reveal the falsity of statements as
to profits of the business where it is of some size
arnl iu ~rnd1 eal-'e he is entitled to rely on the
sell('r's representations.''
The suggestion that ·wall's false statement8 can lw
dismissed as mere puffery is particularly out of harmo11y
with the authorities. Statements about the le"'l'el of business income are simply not in that category. Nor can it
be contended that Wall was only making representations
about the Motel's value as of some previous elate. EYe11
if Wall had not specifically represented, as he did, that
the $300,000.00 Yaluation was justified by current income,
appellants could have relied on the implication that Wall
knew nothing incompatible with that valuation. The Restatement, Section 539, states the legal proposition: "A
Rtatement of opinion in a business transaction upon facts
not disclosed or otherwise known to the recipient may
reasonably be interpreted as an implied statement that
the maker knows of no fact incompatible with his
opinion.''
This record compels confirmation of appellants' default judgment against Wall as against Wall and anyone claiming an equitable interest under him. The trial
court's findings arnl conclusions to the contrary are the
grossest error. There is serious question (particularly
in vieY1' of Fidelity's notice of the Gibbs-Wall fraud action) that responclelltR can look behind the default in any
event. r:l'he law favors the conclusiveness of juclg;ments
as against the partieR arnl their privies. A typical state•20

ment of the <loctrine is this statement from American
.Turi sprudence:
''The general rules as to the conclusiveness
of judgments apply to a judgment by def a ult
which is ordinarily just as conclusive an adjudi~
cation between the parties and privies as one rendered after an answer and contest. Thus, the fact
that a judgment is rendered by default has been
held not to prevent it from operating as a basis
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
When properly rendered, such a judgment has
been regarded as conclusive and binding between
the parties and privies as to matters properly alleged in the complaint or petition in the former
proceeding and necessarily involved and passed
upon." (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 226.)
POINT III
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO WALL'S
FRAUD OR THE JUDGMENT APPELLANTS
OBTAINED BASED UPON IT, APPELLANTS
ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE TRACT'S
TITLE QUIETED IN THEM BECAUSE THE

SALESCONTRACTHASNEVERBEENPE~

FORMED BY THE BUYER.

This is essentially a quiet title action. Appellants
unquestionably held fee title to the Tract in 1962. They
entered into a contract for its sale on September 5, 1962.
Under that contract, the buyer was entitled to conveyance when he ( 1) transferred to appellants acceptable
Pxchange properties valued by Zions Savings Bank at
$18~~,000.00, or (2) paid the purchase price in money or
both money and exchange properties, or (3) deposited
with the trustee securities having a value 21h times the
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value of n11:v m1paicl balance of the purchase pnce.
(Exh. n.)
No one contends that the purchase price has been
paid. Appellants may not lawfully be compelled to convey, therefon•, unless the sales contract has been performe<l by the buyer i11 the deposit of security.
There is evidence that property, the Puehlo 1\Iotel,
was convt>yed to the trustee as security for something.
The property sn "deposited" (lid not, hmYev0r, have a
vahw 21,~ times the $63,000.00 unpaid balance. It had
no value. That appellants or respondents or both ma:·
have been temporaril:· deceiYecl <loes not alter the basic
fact of non-1wrformance by \Vall or by any assignee of
\Vall.
On this record, there can he no valid findi11g of p0rformanec· or substantial performance by Vv all. If this
is Fidelity's theory, it has utterly failed in its proof.
Even if appellants' judgment against \Vall were set
aside, Ficlelit:· would he obliged to pay $63,000.00 to lwcome e11tit1e<l to a deed under the Exhibit 6 contract.
POINT IV

rr1n: ~~VIDENCl~ DOES NOT REVEAL A SITUATION WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL CAN BE INVOKED AGAINST APPJ<:LT ,ANT8.
A fW<'Olld thNJry 011 which Fidclit:· may hav0 proceeded in this case is that appellants represente<l to Fi·

<frlity that vVall had performed his contract under such
c-irrumstances that appellants may not now deny that
performance.
\Ve have already commented on the nature of the
communications between Gibbs and Kump. In total, they
do not amount to a representation that Wall had sufiiciently performed to be entitled to a deed. Against the
ha('kground of the transactions then in contemplation, it
appears that Gibbs was only indicating the deposited
security was sufficient to justify the mortgage which was
in fact consummated. Even Fidelity does not appear to
have construed the Gibbs message as a representation
that ·wan was now entitled to a deed from the trustee. If
FidPlity had so construed the message, it would certainly
havr demanded conveyance from Security, because Fic1elity then had Wall's deed to the Tract.

Even if the Gibbs' communications had been unequivocal, however, we do not have an estoppel situation.
Tlw most quoted definition of estoppel (see Public Utilities Connn. v. Jones, 54 U 111, 179 Pac. 745) is set out in
the American Jurisprudence discussion at 28 Am. J ur.
2nd 628:
"It is the principle by which a party who knows
or should know the truth is absolutely precluded
from denying any material fact which he has,
hy words or conduct, induced another, who was
e~cusably ignorant of the true facts and who had
a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to belie\'e and act upon them, thereby, as a consequence
reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position
in such a way that he would suffer injury if such
denial were allowed.''
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This is a somP\Yliat innllntP statement, hnt it points up
the distinct similarity between the elements of cstoppel
and fraud. It must be true, inter alia, that the party
against ·whom the doctrine is i11voked (1) lrnew the true
facts, ( 2) i11dueed the i11voking party to believe otlwrwise and (3) was in such relationship to the invoking
party tlrnt the invoking party had a right to rely on whatever the estopped party said.
In the instant ease, it rloes not appear that appellants cn•r said anything to Fidelity except that the <lea]
with \Vall was "almost" closed. This is not the kind
of representation which will support an estoppel. Quoting American Jurisprudence again (HI Am . .Jnr., Esbppel, Section 52): "The truthful statement as to the present intention of a party with regard to his future acts is
not the foundation on which an cstoppel may be built."
A more definitive assurance from Gibbs is produced by
Fidelity only i11 tlw form of <t note left for 1\fr. Kump hy
his secretary. The message on the note is not shO"wn to
be a quote; it is cryptic and the rankest hearsay. Appellants were not permitted to examine the writer of the
note. Such notes arc, we find, admissahle "under the
shop hook rule." The langi.rnge of the note does not suggest, however, Gibbs' willingness to permit any different alienation of the Tract than actually occurred.
Even if the Gibbs communications were exactly as
Fidelity representR them, however, it does not appear
that appellants knowingly misinformed Fidelity. Indeed, as soon as they became aware of the falsity of their
information, they brought appropriate action and gave
notice to Fidelity.
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ft does not appear that appellants undertook to in-

dncP Fidelity to do anything or that they stood to gain
by Fidelity's transaction with Wall. Fidelity continually
importuned Gibbs even though it had no right to demand
information from him. There was absolutely no contractual or business relationship between them. If this
was inducement as between Gibbs and Fidelity, Fidelity
was the inducer.
Finally, there is no showing that Fidelity changed
its position for the worse in reliance on anything Gibbs
said. Any payments Fidelity made are either now reeovera ble or (as in the case of the South Davis Water
District demand) satisfied an already existing obligation.
l n short. this is not a situation where the ends of
justice demand that appellants be estopped to deny that
Wall performed his contract. Appellants haven't lied;
tlwy are the victims of lies. They did not "induce" Fidelity; they were solicited by Fidelity. They owed no
duty to Fidelity, but their responses to Fidelity's questions were as accurate as their information would permit. "The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity requires it to be done. In
determining the application of the doctrine, the counterequities of the parties are entitled to due consideration."
(28 Am. Jur. 2nd 631.) Appellants stand to lose
$65,000.00 by reason of Wall's deceit if they are estopped.
Otherwise, Fidelity merely recovers from escrow the consideration previously paid.
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POINT V
FIDELI'11Y
CHASER.

rs

NOT A BONA FIDE PUR-

cannot claim to have acquired legal title to
the Traet by any deed heretofore received by it. It has
deeds from ·wall, who lrn<l the equita blc title of a purchaser, and B. & .J. InvestmentR Co., which had the equitable title of a mortgagee. rrhe second deed was execntrcl
after Fidelity lrnd notice of appellant's suit against ·wall.
Fidelit~r is, in fact, simply a purchaser from a buyer ·who
had not obtained legal title at the time of his resale and
who defaulted on the basic contract. This is a familiar
situation in the law. The second buyer, eYen if he has
paid full consideration, bas consistently been denied, the
status of bona fide purchaser. In determining whethrr
a purchaser is "bona fide'', tlie courts first look to the
nature of his titlr. There is no such thing as a bona ficlr
pnrdiaser ·without legal title. This is a general principlr
of the law of sales whether the property is reill or personal. In their treatise' on Sales, the editors of Cor7ms
Juris 8cn1wl11111 sa~r (77 C ..T.S. 1085):
Fidelit~r

"In ordrr for a transartion to entitle a person to
claim protection as a hona fide purchaser, there
must lw a completPd cleliYery of the property to
tlw purchaser as owner. . . . It is necessary in
onler to he :1 bona fide purchaser that the interest
acquired l>r a legal title, and the good faith acquisition of a merely cquita ble title or interest does
not suffice for this purpose.
and, wi.th speeific rc'frrencc to realty, A mcrican Jurisprud rm cc ( 55 Am . .Tur., Vend or & Purr has er, Sec. 7 66) says
this:
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''The protection afforded a bona fide purchaser
of real estate extends, as a general rule, only to
persons purchasing and acquiring the legal title,
and not to the purchaser of an equitable interest;
and since the interest of a purchaser of real estate
before a conveyance is a mere equitable interest,
it is regarded as insufficient to afford the purchaser protection against an earlier equal equity."
Section 172 ( d) of the Restatement of Restitution
contemplates almost exactly the instant fact situation:
''Thus, if a transfer of land is procured by fraud,
and the fraudulent transferee ... contracts to sell
the land to another, the other is not a bona fide
purchaser since the title to the property has not
been transferred to him, and his equitable claim
is subject to the prior equitable claim of the defrauded person, even though the other pays value
without notice of the fraud."
aml his general doctrine has been adoted by virtually
Pvery court 'vhich has considered the problem. (See
Sequin v. Maloney, 198 Ore. 272, 253 P. 2d 252, 35 A.L.R.
2d 1412).
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CONCLUSION
Appellants 8L~ek to quiet title to land they once
agreed to sell for a purchase price they have never received. Respondents are people who dealt with appellants' buyer and acquired equitable interests in the
land. Each of the parties has taken some action in reliance on -wall's misrepresentations. We submit, however, that appellants, as defrauded sellers, must prevail
against the claims of purchasers of equitable interests
from appellants' fraudulent buyer.
'l'he trial court, forming prejudices beyond comprehension, made finding-8 against the evidence and adopted
conclusions inconsistent with its findings. It supports
tlw findings by unreasonably exercising a discretion not
to believe witness<>s and, presumably, by assuming that
to disbeliev<> a \vitness establishes the opposite of what
he has said.
We cite as error and as evidence of improper trial
the characterization of appellants' witnesses, including
two members of the har, as nearly perjurous, when
their testimony was not even impeached. We submit
that the decision of the trial court ignores the evidence
and offends the law.
Reespectfully submitted,

FRANK .J. ALLEN,

:i51 South State Street

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellants
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